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Ein bulgarischer Politiker macht eine Dienstreise nach Süditalien. „Siehst du diese Straße?“, 
fragt sein italienischer Kollege. „Ja“, antwortet der Gast. „50 % für die Straße, 50 % für mein 
Haus“, sagt der Italiener stolz und zeigt auf seine Villa. „Siehst du diese Brücke?“ fragt er 
weiter. Der Bulgare nickt. „50% für die Brücke, 50 % für mein Auto“, sagt er und zeigt auf 
seinen Ferrari. „Und siehst du diese Schule? 50% für die, 50% für meinen Garten.“ Einige 
Zeit später reist der Italiener nach Bulgarien. Er sieht zehn Villen mit wunderschönen Gärten 
und zehn Ferraris, die davor parken. „Wie kommt es, dass du so reich bist?“ fragt der 
Italiener, und der Bulgare sagt: „Siehst du diese Straße, diese Brücke und diese Schule?“ 
„Nein, da ist nichts“, sagt der Italiener. „Eben.“ 
 
Ivan Krastev, Bulgarian political scientist 
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Abstract 
 
This diploma thesis analyzes the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
corruption in the particular context of international business, and critically 
assesses their behavior in foreign markets. It attempts to answer the question 
whether or not MNCs have different standards of business ethics when 
operating beyond their headquartered country. This is an important field of 
investigation since previous studies have proven the detrimental effects of 
corruption on international business, however the compliance with anti-
corruption laws is hardly explored from a private business point of view. 
This thesis is based on a broad literature review, which consists mainly of 
articles from well-known journals, working papers provided by international 
organizations and NGOs, and some of the rare relevant books, published by 
important figures in corruption research. 
The findings reveal that MNCs operate with different standards in foreign 
countries, especially in developing countries. MNCs mainly from industrialized 
countries have sophisticated payment mechanisms to evade home country 
anti-corruption laws. This implies that they apply double standards regarding 
corruption. Ethical norms, which hold for home countries are no longer abided 
in international markets. This thesis should provide a basic framework for 
further considerations and facilitate empirical studies. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Corruption is a widespread and complex phenomenon. It is defined as the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, IS 1). 
Corruption can be found in developing countries as well as in industrialized 
countries. It is a culturally embedded phenomenon, which differs from country 
to country. It is multidimensional and occurs in various forms, be that the 
misappropriation of public funds, or the purchase of a university degree. 
 
Corruption affects small and big businesses, government revenues and 
spending, but also the average citizen. Corruption is a major barrier in 
reducing poverty in developing countries. It misallocates great sums of 
development assistance to unscrupulous politicians’ private pockets (World 
Bank, IS 2). However, corruption is not exclusively based on immoral 
motivation. It also includes situations where public institutions are weak and 
ordinary people have to bribe officials in order to receive basic public services 
such as health care, education or licenses. 
 
Corruption is not a new phenomenon; it is as ancient as mankind itself. 
Nevertheless, the attention on corruption has increased in the last two 
decades and the society is more aware of corruption since ever before 
(Eicher, 2009). But what has caused this degree of attention now? 
 
First, the availability of information can be one reason for this new 
consciousness (Tanzi, 1998). In 1995, corruption research experienced a 
breakthrough with the publishing of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the 
first index of perceived corruption by the NGO Transparency International (TI). 
The index has made it possible to conduct empirical studies on this issue, 
which was before that, difficult due to missing data. Secondly the increasing 
importance of international organizations such as the United Nations and the 
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OECD1, has brought the dilemma of corruption worldwide under spotlight 
(Eicher, 2009, Tanzi, 1998). Finally, the economic globalization is converging 
societies with different perceptions of trust and business ethics. National firms 
expand their operations to foreign countries to acquire new markets. 
Consequently firms have to face business environments with different norms 
and rules. In a highly integrated corporate environment, different business 
customs and ethics meet together and their difference becomes more obvious 
(Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009, Eicher, 2009). 
 
The role of corruption in international trade is often underestimated, even 
though many studies have found corruption to be detrimental to international 
business (De Jong and Udo, 2006). Corruption discourages Foreign Direct 
Investment (Javorcik and Wei, 2009, Habib and Zurawicki, 2001), influences 
firms’ mode of market entry (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), decreases national 
competitiveness (Sanyal, 2005) and deters economic development (Mauro, 
1995). There is plenty of research on macroeconomic causes and 
consequences regarding corruption. However, relevant literature from a 
private business point of view is rather limited. In particular, studies dealing 
with the behavior of multinational corporations (MNCs) in corrupt 
environments and their compliance with anti-corruption laws are lacking. 
 
Given these facts, this diploma thesis highlights corruption in international 
business and addresses the toleration of corruption by MNCs in foreign 
markets. When keeping in mind the trend for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and the movement of ‘Green Business’2 in industrialized countries 
(Eicher, 2009, Keinert, 2008), the behavior of MNCs in foreign countries, 
mainly developing countries, seems to be a serious contradiction. Many 
multinationals operate in foreign markets with different standards than in their 
home markets (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009). Rose-Ackerman (2002) 
                                                
1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2 In the broader sense, Green Business is an enterprise that operates in a way that has no 
negative impact on the local or global environment, the community or economy (Online 
Dictionary, IS 3). 
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has already addressed this ethical dilemma of corruption and accuses MNCs 
of double standards3. However she analyzed the topic from a behavioral 
scientist’s point of view. Consequently, this paper attempts to highlight this 
paradoxical behavior of MNCs from an economic perspective. 
 
When it comes to corruption in international business, bribery of foreign public 
officials is the most prevalent case, be that for speeding up administration 
delays or to be awarded in large public procurements in the construction 
sector (Eicher, 2009). For this reason, special attention is given on foreign 
bribery of public officials by globally operating companies. 
 
This thesis is based on a broad literature review, which consists mainly of 
articles from well-known journals, working papers provided by international 
organizations and NGOs and some of the rare relevant books, published by 
important figures in corruption research. 
 
The paper is divided into three main parts, beginning with corruption research, 
followed by corruption regarding MNCs and finally concluding with the role of 
MNCs in the fight for anti-corruption. The first part covers the difficulty of 
measuring corruption, forms of corruption, causes and consequences of 
corruption. It also attempts to figure out whether corruption can have 
beneficial effects from an economic point of view. The second part, discusses 
the behavior of MNCs in corrupt markets and the toleration of corruption in 
foreign markets. The last part deals with anti-corruption and points out the 
importance of international and national anti- corruption laws and finalizes 
with the significance of corporate code of conducts, as a tool for enforcing an 
ethical business philosophy. 
 
                                                
3 Double standard is an attribute used for the unequal and unfair application of moral codes or 
principles of good behavior on different groups. In the context of corruption, it describes 
the use of different standards of business ethics in different markets (Online dictionary, IS 
4). 
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2 Clarification of terms 
2.1 Multinational corporations 
Companies operating in multiple countries are more often faced with 
corruption than others (Beets, 2005). Therefore this research focuses on 
multinational corporations (MNCs) that are characterized by operating in more 
than one country with headquarter in the home country. It distinguishes from a 
company producing and exporting from its home market into various 
countries, by its substantial direct investment in the host countries. Further, it 
is important to highlight the strong engagement of the MNC’s headquarter in 
the management of its legally independent subsidiaries in overseas markets. 
(Bartlett et al., 2003, Dunning, 1993). For this reason the subsidiaries are 
somehow influenced by the perception of business ethics and practices of its 
parent company. 
 
2.2 Favoritism 
Favoritism is giving preferential treatment to certain people by persons who 
have entrusted power, e.g. public officials who decide upon the distribution of 
resources. This can be either family, friends or others close to them but also 
people of the same ethnic or religious group. For example, an applicant for an 
employment is selected based on personal relationships, rather than on 
competences and experience. A special form is nepotism that limits the 
preferred persons to family members and close friends, also called 
‘Freunderlwirtschaft’ in Austria (Andvig et al., 2000). 
 
2.3 Red tape 
The term ‘red tape’ describes excessive administrative regulation and 
inefficiency of government bureaucracy; the rigid adherence of formal rules by 
public officials. The term originates from the cord used for tying together 
government documents in the early centuries of British colonialism. It is a 
burden to organizations in everyday business, and causes long waiting times 
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and obscure official procedures (Luton, 2000, Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). 
Hence many businesses bribe public officials to speed up procedures and to 
overcome bureaucratic burdens (Méon and Sekkat, 2005). 
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3 PART I: Corruption research 
 
Corruption is difficult to define, difficult to monitor and difficult to measure. 
Nevertheless, in the last two decades corruption has become a popular field 
of research (Frank, 2004). Major part of the literature is analyzing the topic 
from a political or legal point of view. The following sections give an overview 
on corruption research from an economic point of view and focus on 
international business. 
 
3.1 Definition of corruption 
 
Numerous scholars have published papers on the effects of corruption. 
Nevertheless, the literature is lacking in defining and classifying this illicit 
activity. International organizations, such as the United Nations or the leading 
NGO in anti-corruption Transparency International, have held various 
conferences on anti-corruption strategies and have filled numerous pages 
with reports on corruption, but a clear and satisfying definition, which covers 
all possible forms and occurrences, can’t be found hardly anywhere. 
 
Corruption is a phenomenon that is heavily embedded in culture. Business 
ethics differ from country to country and hence the perception of corruption 
differs as well. For instance, some business practices that are regarded as 
corrupt in Germany are ethically accepted in China, where it is usual to begin 
a business relation with personal gift giving. The nuance of what is legal and 
what is illegal is very subtle and differs from culture to culture (Fleming and 
Zyglidopoulos, 2009). Andvig et al. (2000) agree on the complexity to find a 
universal definition of corruption that can be applied to all business 
environments. Consequently, defining corruption can be a question of political, 
cultural, economic, or moral attitude. 
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Nevertheless, what is corruption about? What does it mean and what “count” 
as corruption? 
 
The etymology of the term corruption goes back to the mid 14th century, from 
the old French word corroptio, which means ‘unhealthy and uncouth’ and 
directly stems from the Latin word corrumpere, meaning ‘to destroy, to mar or 
to spoil’, but also figuratively ‘to seduce or to bribe’ (Skeat, 1993). 
 
Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as “the behavior on the part 
of officials in the public sector, whether politicians or civil servants, in which 
they improperly and unlawfully enrich themselves, or those close to them, by 
the misuse of the public power entrusted to them” (Asian Development Bank, 
2005). A similar interpretation is made by the OECD, which states that 
corruption is the “active or passive misuse of the powers of public officials 
(appointed or elected) for private financial or other benefits” (2007, p. 152). 
 
Another definition that is often cited in the literature comes from Nye (1989), 
“Behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of 
private- regarding [..] pecuniary or state gains, or violates rules against the 
exercise of certain types or private-regarding influence” (quoted in Fleming 
and Zyglidopoulos, 2009, p. 5). 
 
To sum up, most of the definitions share the common attention upon the 
misuse of public power for private benefit. The attribute misuse refers to a 
behavior that deviates from the formal duties of a public role. The term private 
benefit outlines the obtaining of money or valuable assets, but covers also 
increases in power or status, as well as future favors for friends or relatives. 
Public power is carried out by persons elected to public positions, such as 
bureaucrats and politicians and is exercised in different sectors. For example, 
“judiciary, public procurement, business regulations and granting of permit, 
privatization, foreign exchange (including customs, trade permits, international 
financial transactions), taxes (including granting of tax exemptions), police, 
subsidies, public utility (water, electricity, telephone, garbage collection, health 
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care), and government services (health, education)” (Lambsdorff, 2007, p. 
16). 
In general all definitions approve that corruption is a problem and arises only 
in the interaction of public and private interests, where someone holds a 
public office and takes advantage of it by violating the rules. However, these 
interpretations do not apply to corrupt activities in the private sphere. Most of 
the definitions are limited to situations in which one side is a public official 
(Husted, 1999). This focus on the private and public division is often criticized 
and contributes much to the confusion in interpreting corruption (Bratsis, 
2003, Treisman, 2000). 
 
Only recently the discussion has extended from public corruption to corruption 
in the private sector. The statement of the European Union that declares 
corruption as the abuse of power for private gain (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2003) does not limit corruption only to public crime. It 
evades the term ‘public’, in order to cover actions where power is not 
distributed by the state. One way to overcome the complexity of corruption is 
to keep the definition rather general. Affirmative to these concerns the United 
Nations define corruption as “requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly 
or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which 
distorts the proper performance of any duty or behavior required of the 
recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the prospect thereof” (United 
Nations, 2005, p. 132). 
 
Since this paper focuses on the behavior of multinational corporations in 
corruption rather than political inefficiency, a definition that includes both 
private firms and government officials is used for the purpose of this thesis. 
The further research is based on the current definition of Transparency 
International, “Corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” 
(Transparency International, IS 1). This interpretation allows focusing on the 
unethical action, rather on the kind of person who is engaged. 
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3.1.1 Definition of bribery 
The OECD defines bribery as “the offering, promising, or giving something in 
order to influence a public official in the execution of his/her official duties” 
(Sanyal and Smanta, 2004, p. 1). This can involve monetary or other financial 
benefits, such as scholarships for university education, or non-financial 
benefits such as favorable publicity (Sanyal and Smanta, 2004). 
 
Foreign bribery is the most frequent form of corruption in international 
business. It occurs when first, a border is crossed and second, involves the 
production, distribution or circulation of legitimate goods or services, usually 
by multinational firms. Foreign bribery takes place when “employees and 
agents of multinational corporations illicitly reward government officials of host 
countries with monetary, material, or social assets in order to obtain business 
contracts and concessions” (Sung, 2005, p. 112). There are many terms 
describing bribery, such as kickback, payoff, graft, payola, slush money or 
grease money (Andvig et al., 2000). 
 
3.2 Measurement of corruption 
The main challenge in corruption research is to collect consistent and reliable 
empirical data (Husted, 1999). Corruption is illicit and unethical, and thus 
takes place undercover. As it is with other criminal activities, corruption is hard 
to observe directly. It is not registered anywhere, nor do direct victims exist, 
and the involved parties do their best to keep it in secret. Obviously it is very 
difficult to acquire first hand information, causing researchers to rely on 
perception-based measures, which are subjective and rather inaccurate 
(Treisman, 2000). 
 
A very early quantitative study was conducted by Mauro (1995), who analyzed 
an index (published by Business International), including 52 countries based 
upon estimations of journalists, businesspeople and specialists, who were 
asked to tell to what extent business transactions in the country in question 
 10 
 
involved corruption and questionable payments (Andvig et al., 2000, Mauro, 
1995). 
 
These days a range of private and public institutions, such as business 
consultancies, research companies, NGO’s and universities, make an effort to 
observe the international business environment to provide similar indices. 
These surveys include domestic and expatriate business people as well as 
ordinary residents on the perceived level of corruption in the countries where 
they live or work. The comparative results from these surveys are remarkably 
consistent. Different indices correlate highly. Domestic and foreign business 
people, consultancy firms and residents basically agree about which countries 
have more corrupt governments (Treisman, 2000). 
Today, Transparency International (TI) publishes the most accepted and 
commonly used index, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), annually. 
 
3.2.1 The Corruption Perception Index 
Founded in 1993 and headquartered in Berlin, Transparency International is 
today the leading non-governmental organization, which deals against 
corruption with 90 departments worldwide. 
 
The first CPI was published in 1995 and was designed by Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff, who plays a pivotal role in corruption research. Until 2008 the CPI 
was calculated under his direction at the University of Passau, in Germany. 
The publication of the CPI was an important step for the research in 
corruption since it was the first time when a corruption index was made 
available to the public. Each year the presentation of the new CPI ranking 
arouses the attention of the media, stirs up political debates and consequently 
creates awareness in society for the problems caused by corruption. Many 
countries have realized the urgency of anti-corruption policies for their 
international reputation, in terms of political and economic attractiveness. But 
also from an academic point of view, the establishment of TI’s corruption 
index was of great importance. It provides the foundation for further empirical 
research and since then the research on corruption has been flourishing. 
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The CPI evaluates the level of perceived corruption by politicians and public 
officials. Hence it deals with corruption in the public sector and includes the 
embezzlement of public funds and the subject of bribery. The CPI ranks 
countries by its corruption level from 0 to 10, whereas 10 indicates a country 
with a low level of perceived corruption and 0 represents a country perceived 
to be highly corrupt. This ranking allows a cross-country comparison. In 1995 
the index covered 41 countries and in 2010 it included 178 countries. At the 
present the index is based on the weighted average of 13 different expert 
surveys and investigations, which are conducted by 10 independent 
institutions. A country is included in the ranking provided that it is evaluated by 
at least three surveys. The score of a country is a better indicator of perceived 
corruption than its ranking because the ranking can change every year simply 
because new countries enter the index or others drop out due to non-
availability of data (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
 
According to the CPI 2010 the three ‘cleanest’ countries in 2010 are Denmark, 
New Zealand, and Singapore, whereas the countries with the highest 
perceived corruption are Somalia, Myanmar and Afghanistan. Austria ranks 
15th, the USA 22nd, Italy attains place 67 and Russia is inconceivably 154th out 
of 178. An alarming finding is that nearly 75% of 178 nations score below 54. 
The following figure visualizes the result of the CPI 2010. 
 
 
                                                
4 For results of the CPI 2010 see Appendix, figure A, p. 77 
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Figure 1: Results of Corruption Perception Index 2010 (Source: TI, 2010) 
 
The illustration reflects that countries with higher levels of perceived 
corruption are primarily developing countries, which are marked by long-
standing conflicts and political instability, such as in Afghanistan or Myanmar. 
However it also highlights that the issue of corruption is not only constrained 
to third world countries; some industrialized countries are performing very 
poorly as well, such as Greece, Italy and France5. 
 
How reliable is Transparency International’s corruption index? The CPI 2010 
is a combination of 13 different surveys from 10 independent organizations. 
This makes the index statistically robust and reduces the chance of errors. 
Further, the methodology used to assess the data is the same for all 
countries. According to Transparency International the results from different 
organizations correlate well with each other. This holds even for different 
types of respondents; the assessment of locals goes along with those of 
                                                
5 More on this see below “The Bribe Payers Index” p. 14 
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foreign country experts (TI, 2010, Lambsdorff, 2007). Likewise, when 
comparing the CPI with other corruption perception indices, the results do 
correspond with each other. For example the index compiled by Business 
International, which was used by Mauro in 1995 (Treisman, 2000). 
 
However, there are some limitations to the CPI. Galtung (1998) criticizes the 
significance of the CPI due to its subjective ranking. He labels it a ‘survey on 
surveys’. Second he argues that it measures only the rankings in relation to 
other countries but does not give any information on the absolute number of 
corrupt transactions. Furthermore Lambsdorff (2007) points out that the 
annual changes in ranking of one country can be induced by variations in the 
number of included countries. Thus the index is not an appropriate tool for 
trend analysis or for monitoring changes over time. Moreover he adds that the 
definition of corruption varies between the surveys and thus it is questionable 
whether they measure the same phenomenon (Lambsdorff, 1999). The 
questionnaires ask about the extent of perceived corruption, but it is rather 
unclear whether it aims at the frequency of corrupt activities or the paid 
amount of bribes. In addition to it, the surveys do not differentiate between 
administrative and political corruption6 (Andvig et al., 2000). 
 
Besides the CPI, Transparency International publishes a second index, the 
Bribe Payers Index (BPI). The BPI is of greater importance to this diploma 
thesis, because it deals with corruption carried out by companies in foreign 
markets. 
 
                                                
6 According to Transparency International political corruption is "the behavior of (elected) 
public officials which diverges from the formal components - the duties and powers, rights 
and obligations - of a public role to seek private gain" (Khan, IS 5). Administrative 
corruption is defined as "the institutionalized personal abuse of public resources by civil 
servants" (Khan, IS 5). 
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3.2.2 The Bribe Payers Index 
While the CPI is measuring corruption from the demand side, meaning the 
bribe taking, the BPI is dealing with the supply side of corruption. The bribe 
giving, defined as those who are willing to pay money out of their own 
motivation in order to receive benefits. 
 
The Bribe Payers Index ranks the leading exporting countries in terms of the 
degree to which their companies are perceived to be paying bribes in foreign 
markets based on interviews of senior business executives. The first BPI was 
released in 1999 and the latest BPI in 2008 and includes the 22 world’s most 
economically influential countries accounting for 75% of exports of goods and 
services and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) outflows. As well as the CPI, the 
BPI scores range from 0 to 10. The higher the score for a country, the lower 
the likelihood for companies headquartered in this country to participate in 
bribery when doing business abroad (TI, 2008). 
The countries are selected on the base of their FDI inflows and imports, and 
some due to their importance in regional trade, namely, Australia, Brazil, India 
and South Africa. 
 
According to the BPI 2008, Belgian and Canadian companies are perceived to 
be least likely to engage in bribery in foreign markets, followed by firms from 
the Netherlands and Switzerland. Whereas at the bottom of the ranking are 
Russian companies, which are most likely to bribe when doing business 
abroad (see figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Bribe Payers Index 2008 (Source: TI, 2008) 
 
According to the BPI 2008 “companies based in emerging economic 
countries, such as China, India and Russia, are perceived to routinely engage 
in bribery when doing business abroad” (Transparency International, IS 6). 
 
Additionally the Bribe Payers Survey ranks sectors according to the degree of 
perceived bribery of foreign officials. Sanyal and Guvenli (2009) remark that 
some industries and transactions, especially ‘big-ticket items’ are more prone 
to bribery than others. Hence it is plausible that a company for consumer 
products will not give bribes to win a contract in a foreign country, while a 
company for oil from the same country may behave differently.  
The findings by sectors in the Bribe Payers Survey support this concern and 
show that bribery of public officials are highest in the sector for public works 
contracts and construction, followed by real estate and property development 
(see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Bribery of public officials by sectors (Source: TI, 2008) 
 
The results of the Bribe Payers Survey demonstrate the significant role of 
corruption in international business. Corruption is not a phenomenon 
constrained only on developing countries; the BPI displays that many of the 
world’s most influential economies are experienced to be corrupt. 
 
3.3 Forms of corruption 
 
There are several terms, such as bribery, embezzlement and fraud, which are 
all closely related to corruption but examining the topic from different point of 
views. Tanzi (1998) classifies corrupt acts in different categories as follows: 
 
• bureaucratic or political 
• cost-reducing or benefit-enhancing 
• briber-initiated or bribee-initiated 
• coercive or collusive 
• centralized or decentralized 
• predictable or arbitrary, and 
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• monetary or non-monetary forms 
 
Each of these types has different causes and effects, with some being 
perceived more severely than others. This distinction is not exclusive, for 
example bureaucratic corruption can be centralized and at the same time 
predictable. Corruption is not limited to one of the following characteristics. 
Certainly this categorization could be extended by other attributes, but it gives 
a good overview about the various instances of corruption. 
 
3.3.1 Bureaucratic versus political corruption 
Bureaucratic and political corruption can be defined with reference to the 
persons involved and their hierarchy level in a public system. In any case, 
both types belong to public corruption. 
Bureaucratic corruption takes place in the lower levels of public hierarchy and 
involves public officials. That’s why it is also known as “petty corruption”7, 
which is the most frequently occurring case. Often these are payments to 
public officials to speed up bureaucratic processes. Companies are forced to 
pay in order to avoid long waiting times, for instance to register a firm or to 
require licenses and permits for imports and exports (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
Citizens can encounter bureaucratic corruption in everyday life, for example in 
public administration and services like hospitals, schools, local licensing 
authorities and so on. The paid amount of money is rather modest. In many 
countries this is a very common practice and in some cases it is not even 
possible to get things done without petty corruption. 
 
In practice, however, this kind of corruption is regarded as minor crime and 
justified to circumvent bureaucratic barriers, also known as facilitation 
payments. However, researchers advert to the detrimental consequences of 
tolerated petty corruption (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Petty corruption reduces 
                                                
7 Petty means of little importance, in the sense of small size and comes from the French word 
petit=small (Skeat, 1993). 
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the economic attractiveness of a country, worsens the business climate and 
makes normal day-to-day transactions exhausting (Eicher, 2009). 
Whereas petty corruption is found in lower sections of public administration, 
political corruption takes place at the higher level of political authority, that is 
why it is also called “grand corruption”. 
 
Grand corruption is the misuse of political power for personal gain; when 
politicians or political decision makers, such as heads of states, national 
representatives, ministers, employees of federal departments, and top officials 
are corrupt themselves. They abuse or exploit their political position to enrich 
themselves, directly or indirectly (relatives and friends) at the expense of 
public interest (TI, 2004). These are “highly placed individuals who exploit 
their positions to extract large bribes from national and transnational 
corporations, who appropriate significant pay-offs from contract scams, or 
who embezzle large sums of money from the public treasury into private bank 
accounts” (Andvig et al., 2000, p. 18). Besides bribe paying, political 
corruption also includes situations where politicians change laws and 
regulations for their own benefit (Moody-Stuart, 1997). 
 
Political corruption enjoys high interest from media and public, first due to the 
high position of the involved persons and second because of the sizable 
amount of bribes. 
 
3.3.2 Cost reducing versus benefit enhancing corruption 
The difference between both cases is the monetary result of the bribery for 
the briber. This could be on the one hand the saving of costs, such as bribing 
a tax inspector in order to reduce one’s tax bill, or on the other hand to 
increase profits. For example an illicit but common practice in the construction 
sector is to win the job for a lucrative public project by bribing the awarding 
authority. The winning contractor might not be the most competitive company 
and might not offer the most cost-effective tender (Rose- Ackerman, 1997). 
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3.3.3 Briber-initiated versus bribee-initiated corruption 
Furthermore, the literature distinguishes between the demand side and the 
supply side of corruption. The supply side of corruption represents those who 
offer corrupt payments, briber-initiated, whereas the demand side covers 
those who demand and accept illicit payments, thus bribee-initiated (Baughn 
et al., 2010, Sung, 2005, Beets, 2005). The important characteristic is that in 
supplied corruption, the briber voluntarily offers money to take advantage of 
the venality of someone. For instance parents bribe their children’s teacher in 
order to receive a good grade. Here the teacher does not ask for an incentive 
and so the parents are not forced to bribe, in fact they do it of their own free 
will. 
In bribee-initiated corruption the bribee abuses his power and forces the 
briber to pay. For instance, in India the traffic police regularly stops cars, to get 
some extra money. All natives are aware of this illegal custom, but 
nonetheless the people prefer to pay small amounts instead of getting a ticket. 
 
In former days those who paid bribes were seen as the culprit of corruption. 
The public official, who is bribed by multinational firms, was seen as a victim. 
Only recently the attitude towards the demand-side of corruption changed and 
the focus of anti-corruption campaigns is also on abolishing the demand of 
corruption (Beets, 2005). 
 
3.3.4 Coercive versus collusive corruption 
In coercive corruption someone is forced or threatened to carry out the corrupt 
transaction, and it can be initiated from the briber or the bribe taker. This type 
includes blackmailing and extortion. This could be the case when an official, 
who accepted a corrupt deal once, is now forced a second time to agree and 
if not he is threatened with whistle blowing8 of the first illicit activity. 
 
                                                
8 Whistle blowing is the reporting of illegal or immoral activities to external authorities or to 
public. It is characterized by disloyal behavior to an organization or group, which is 
accused of (Jubb, 1999). 
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In general, collusion is the secret or illegal cooperation or conspiracy, 
particularly in order to cheat or deceive others (Skeat, 1993). In the context of 
corruption this means that the bribe taker and the briber freely agree on the 
fraud. In contrast to coercive corruption, collusive corruption requires the 
approval of both sides. Hence, this classification of corruption concentrates on 
the voluntariness of the involved parties. 
 
3.3.5 Centralized versus decentralized corruption 
Centralized corruption is organized and involves more than two parties, where 
even a whole system could be associated with the crime. It is a form of 
collusion, and consists on systematized sharing of corrupt proceeds on 
various hierarchical levels (Bac, 1998). Klitgaard (1988) gives the example of 
centralized corruption in the Hong Kong police force during the 1960s and 
1970s, where officials collected money from drug and gambling dens. He 
reports that about HK $65,000 were collected each month, and the sum was 
divided in an organized and hierarchical way, ranging from HK $50 for a lower 
ranked policeman and around HK $4000 for a senior official. 
 
This paradox case illustrates the structural acceptance of centralized 
corruption within a network and its hierarchical character. Most of the network 
members are part of the game and take the situation as given, or are forced 
to, even those who are responsible for the supervision of the activities. The 
dangerous aspect of centralized corruption is the creation of a culture of 
corruption, and the difficulty for the environment to dissociate from it, which 
leads to a dissemination of corruption (Bac, 1998). 
 
In contrast to centralized corruption, decentralized corruption involves no 
hierarchy. It is an individual and isolated act of corruption, with the motivation 
being the personal benefit. Most cases of petty corruption can be categorized 
in this group. 
 
 21  
3.3.6 Predictable versus arbitrary corruption 
The predictability or the arbitrariness of corruption is a crucial characteristic. 
Corruption is arbitrary or unpredictable when the bribee doesn’t know in 
advance about the amount of the payment, when the bribee is asked for more 
money, for example by other officials, and when the confidence of the service 
delivery is not given. Arbitrary corruption is chaotic; several bureaucrats ask 
independent bribes on firms to maximize their own revenues. This causes a 
greater level of uncertainty over the size of payment and the eventual results 
of the bribe (Doh et al., 2003, Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). 
In contrast, predictable corruption is organized, in the sense that people know 
in advance what to expect in exchange for a bribe. This bribe payment is 
predictable to corporations, similar to a tax raised by the government, besides 
the fact that the money goes to a public official’s pocket. Under such 
conditions companies are still able to operate with some degree of 
predictability even when the corruption level is high. The lack of coordination 
among corrupt agents makes it difficult for companies to evaluate the actual 
impact of corruption on their operations and result in lower economic activities 
by foreign investors (Doh et al., 2003, Wei, 1997). 
 
The following table shows the linkage between the predictability of corruption 
and the level of corruption. With a sample of 26 African countries, it was found 
the higher the confidence of bribe payments the higher will be the perceived 
level of corruption (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
 
Figure 4: Corruption and confidence (Source: Lambsdorff, 2007) 
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Unpredictability of corruption has a significant negative effect on foreign 
investment due to the lack of confidence to investors9 (De Jong and 
Bogmans, 2010, Lambsdorff, 2007, Wei, 1997). 
 
3.3.7 Monetary versus non-monetary corruption 
Monetary corruption involves the payment of cash, which is called a bribe, 
kickback or payoff, and is the most common way. 
 
In non-monetary corruption other forms of incentives are used instead of 
cash. This could be a luxurious journey or just a coffee machine; everything 
that does not include cash. Nepotism is a form of non-monetary corruption10. 
This form of corruption is very difficult to discover and in some countries it is 
not regarded as illicit, more as a trivial offense. 
 
This classification by Tanzi could be extended with other characteristics, but in 
general it gives a good overview and shows the complexity of corruption and 
its multidimensionality. It helps to understand and to analyze individual acts of 
corruption. 
 
3.4 Causes of corruption in international business 
Causes of corruption are strongly interconnected with consequences of 
corruption. Often it is difficult to judge whether certain characteristics and 
circumstances produce corruption or if corruption itself is the triggering event, 
which causes a certain consequence (Lambsdorff, 2006). For instance many 
empirical studies give evidence for the correlation between corruption level 
and economic wealth of a country (Mauro, 1995; Husted, 1999), but scholars 
are indifferent in the direction of the causality. Does an economically poor 
country lack in resources to fight corruption and thus bring corruption to 
                                                
9 More on the effects of unpredictability see chapter “Corruption and Foreign Direct 
Investment”, p.30 
10 See chapter “Favoritism”, p.4 
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flourish, or does corruption hinder a country’s economic development? This 
example shows that in reality causes and consequences intertwine. So, quite 
frequently it is just two sides of the same coin. 
 
The issue of causality and economic effects is a broad and in depth explored 
area of corruption research. For this reason, this thesis is limited to causes 
and (in the following chapter) consequences of corruption in international 
business. 
 
The comparison of cross-country data exhibits differences in perceived 
corruption levels across countries. What are the reasons that perceived 
corruption is more widespread in some countries than in others? 
One of the most comprehensive quantitative analysis, available on causes of 
corruption was conducted by Treisman (2000). He investigated a multitude of 
determinants of corruption and finally found six variables that significantly 
explain 89% of the variation in the Corruption Perception Index (Frank, 2004). 
 
In the following the determinants relevant to international business context are 
described on the base of Treisman’s findings. 
 
3.4.1 Corruption and economic openness 
Many economists see the major cause of corruption in governmental 
restrictions on economic freedom (Lambsdorff, 2007, Graeff and Mehlkop, 
2003, Tanzi, 1998). Economic freedom incorporates the possibility to do 
business without being restricted by governmental regulations within a 
country. For example, the receiving of permits and licenses or the legal 
security of private property rights  (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
 
Many countries, in particular developing countries, have complicated and 
nontransparent regulations, which give public officials monopolistic power and 
cause long waiting times for administrative processes. These conditions are 
favorable for public officials to ask for extra payments and increase the 
frequency of offering bribes by business agents (Tanzi, 1998). 
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Heavy regulations bring along red tape11 and negatively affect market entry of 
businesses, in particular foreign businesses. Restrictive regulations cause 
higher barriers for international competitors to enter the market (Lambsdorff, 
2007). Djankov et al. (2002) analyzed the influence of governmental 
regulations on market entry of start-up companies. Their data covered the 
number of procedures, official time and official costs required for starting a 
new business in 85 countries. They found that countries with heavier 
regulations have higher levels of corruption and larger unofficial economies. 
On the contrary, countries with higher degree of democratization and limited 
governmental interventions have lighter entry regulations. This finding also 
holds when controlling for economic development. They come to the 
conclusion that entry regulations are beneficial to corrupt politicians and 
bureaucrats (Djankov et al., 2002). 
 
Hence, governmental restrictions on economic freedom hinder market entry of 
international companies, are likely to reduce competition and result in higher 
corruption (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
 
3.4.2 Corruption and economic development 
Researchers have found a strong connection between corruption and the 
level of economic development. Figure 5 visualizes the relation between the 
scores of CPI 2008 and economic wealth, measured by income per head. It 
shows the close connection between a country’s economic performance and 
its level of perceived corruption (University of Passau, 2008). This is in line 
with results of other studies (Treisman, 2000). 
                                                
11 Red tape refers to excessive administrative regulations that are a burden to everyday 
business. More on p.4 
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Figure 5: Corruption and economic wealth (Source: University of Passau, IS 7) 
 
Treisman (2000) found that rich countries are perceived to be less corrupt 
than poor ones. Without doubt, there is a strong correlation between 
economic development and corruption but nevertheless, the direction of 
causality is questionable. It is difficult to assess whether poverty causes 
corruption, or corruption hinders the economic development of a country. 
While corruption is likely to lower economic development12, poorer countries 
lack the resources to effectively combat corruption (Husted, 1999). Poverty is 
a condition that is strongly correlated with other variables. For example, 
higher economic development increases the spread of education, thus 
enhances democracy and raises government revenues that again allow 
countries to better combat corruption (Treisman, 2000). Previous studies have 
supported this view and argue that corruption deters economic growth 
(Mauro, 1995). Despite the direction of causality, it is likely to believe that the 
economic development of a country does reduce its corruption13. 
 
                                                
12 See chapter “Corruption and economic growth”, p. 33 
13 See chapter “Corruption and economic growth”, p. 33 
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3.4.3 Corruption and public salaries 
When wages in the public sector are remarkably low, there is a higher 
tendency for bureaucratic corruption (Sanyal, 2005, Treisman, 2000, Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). Public officials who are paid low salaries but 
have at the same time administrative power, for instance, who are responsible 
for procurement contracts, privatizations and the award of concessions, are 
susceptible to asking for bribes in order to make some additional earnings 
(Sanyal, 2005). The likelihood for this behavior increases when monitoring 
and transparency mechanism are weak. 
 
According to Sanyal (2005), it can be argued that public officials who are 
remunerated appropriately may be less prone to accept bribes or other illicit 
offers. 
The extent of linkage of the level of public sector salaries to the level of 
corruption, was investigated by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997). Their 
main findings show that low salaries drive public servants to supplement their 
incomes by taking bribes. Simultaneously high salaries imply higher 
alternative costs if detected for fraudulent behavior. With a sample size of 28 
developing countries they find a significant negative influence of civil service 
wages on the level of corruption in the manufacturing sector. An increase of 
public wages by 100% would improve the corruption index of a country by the 
order of 2 points in the corruption index (CPI) of Transparency International. 
However, the analysts point out the problem of reverse causality, meaning 
that corrupt countries tend to have low budgets and thus, as a consequence 
cannot afford to pay higher wages to public officials (Lambsdorff, 2006). 
 
There are some speculations in the theoretical literature whether high wages 
can reduce corruption. Tanzi (1998) distinguishes between bureaucratic 
corruption caused by greed, that is the case of a public official accepting 
bribes due to psychological and moral characteristics, and corruption caused 
by need, that is the case of a corrupt public official due to economic necessity. 
Corruption due to greed implies that the civil servant is corrupt, regardless of 
his wage level and hence wage policies would not change his opportunistic 
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behavior. Some studies, like Treisman (2000) and Rauch and Evans (2000), 
could find only ambiguous and mostly insignificant results on the impact of 
public wages on corruption. 
 
Nevertheless, even when assuming a negative impact of low wages on 
corruption the practical implication is rather unrealistic. In order to achieve a 
tangibly effect in curtailing corruption, the wages need to be increased 
excessively, which turns out to be a costly approach to fight corruption (Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 1997). 
 
3.4.4 Corruption and cultural determinants 
Can cultural traits clarify why some countries are more prone to corruption 
than others? Most studies exploring the causes of corruption have looked 
from an economic or political point of view and have left out the cultural 
perspective. However, Hofstede (2010) has proven that cultural 
characteristics have an influence on how business is conducted. Only recently 
the empirical research on corruption has paid attention to cultural 
determinants.  
 
Do cultural characteristics play a role in the occurrence of corruption? If yes, 
which specific cultural traits determine the selection of unethical business 
practices, such as bribery? 
 
In 1999, Husted conducted the first empirical study on a database of 44 
countries, which sought to answer the question whether bribery is a culturally 
or economically determined phenomenon. In his study, Husted came to the 
conclusion that most important determinant for corruption is the level of 
economic development as measured by the GNP per capita.  
 
Second, corruption is considerably correlated with power distance. Power 
distance reflects how societies deal with inequality. It is “the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country 
expect and accept that power is distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 
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61). This means that people from cultures with high power distance tend to 
tolerate corruption more than people from low power-distance cultures 
(Husted, 1999). 
 
Third, corruption is positively correlated with masculinity. Masculinity refers, 
among other things, to material success. Masculine societies emphasize on 
mastery, self-assertiveness and ambitiousness. People are willing to compete 
with others to achieve their goals (Hofstede, 2010). In terms of corruption, this 
leads to “a greater willingness to participate in corrupt transactions in the 
pursuit of material success” (Husted, 1999, p. 344). 
 
The fourth significant variable is uncertainty avoidance and is defined as “the 
extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or 
unknown situations” (Hofstede, 2010, p. 191). Hofstede mentions that people 
from high uncertainty avoiding cultures accept unethical behavior more often 
in order to reduce their anxiety. Regarding corruption, Husted explains that 
companies coming from cultures with high uncertainty avoidance aim to 
reduce uncertainty in the context of decisions by public officials through 
bribes. “Corruption can be viewed as a mechanism to reduce uncertainty and 
in situations where the outcomes are uncertain, corruption may serve to 
secure a more certain result” (Husted, 1999, p. 345). 
 
The cultural variable individualism failed to be significant, which might be, 
according to Husted, the consequence of the high consistency with GNP per 
capita. Both variables carry similar information – redundant information – so 
that the contribution of the variable Individualism is insignificant in the model. 
 
All three cultural variables: power distance, masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance are positively correlated to corruption. On the basis of his results 
Husted characterizes a “cultural profile of a corrupt country as one in which 
there is high uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity, and high power 
distance” (Husted, 1999, p. 354). 
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Nonetheless Husted remarks that economic factors, such as the availability of 
resources, can moderate the effect of cultural determinants (Husted, 1999). 
This concern is strongly confirmed by Sanyal and Guvenli’s (2009) findings. 
With data for 30 countries they analyzed the relationship between five cultural 
variables and one economic variable with the Bribe Payers Index. Indeed, 
they confirm that cultural variables, such as power distance, individualism, are 
significantly related to bribery. “However, when the level of economic 
development in the home country, measured by per capita income, is 
included, the impact of cultural factors is muted considerably” (Sanyal and 
Guvenli, 2009, p. 287). Cultural traits are influential but this does not hold 
when economic factors are considered. 
 
Contrary to Husted’s findings, Sanyal and Guvenli (2009) conclude that 
cultural aspects are less important variables in bribery. Economic 
characteristics, such as “per capita income (purchasing power parity) in the 
home country is the single most important factor determining a firm’s 
propensity to bribe abroad” (Sanyal and Guvenli, 2009, p. 295). The findings 
of Sanyal and Guvenli’s study have to be interpreted cautiously because the 
sample size is relatively small with 30 countries, and the data is not compared 
with other time periods. 
 
To sum up, studies have found a significant influence of cultural variables on 
corruption, but nonetheless the results provide support to the hypothesis that 
economic determinism is the stronger force that explains the propensity to 
bribe. 
 
3.5 Consequences of corruption on international 
business 
 
This part gives a general overview of the consequences of corruption with 
focus on international business. 
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3.5.1 Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) plays a pivotal role in international business. 
In particular, it is important for the economic development of low-income 
countries, where local capital is much more limited (Habib and Zurawicki, 
2001). According to the OECD, FDI is the ownership of one country’s 
business or other property, by entities of another country. This can be an 
individual, public or private enterprise or government. It is characterized by an 
economically long-term relationship between both entities and involves all 
transactions between both entities (OECD, 1999). 
 
There are several studies providing evidence of the negative correlation 
between Foreign Direct Investment and corruption. Javorcik and Wei (2009) 
identify a significant negative impact of corruption on FDI and note that 
corruption increases the cost of doing business in terms of obtaining local 
licenses and permits. 
 
This goes in line with Habib and Zurawicki’s (2001) findings. According to their 
study corruption has a substantially greater impact on foreign investment than 
on local investment. The authors interpret this result in the way that local 
investors are better positioned than foreign investors in managing corrupt 
environments due to their familiarity with the local business practices. In 
decision-making regarding FDI, transaction cost variables such as 
interpersonal relations, information asymmetries, market-specific know-how 
(culture, language, common business practices) are more important than 
production-related variables (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). Further, they note 
that foreign investors have the alternative option to choose other countries to 
invest, something which most of the local investors do not have. “Under these 
circumstances, investors will prefer not to invest and will likely divert the 
money to a safer investment location. In the long run, the economy and its 
growth will suffer” (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001, p. 689). 
 
Likewise De Jong and Udo (2006) find empirical evidence for the detrimental 
effect of corruption on international trade. They find that the nature of 
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corruption is pivotal. They distinguish between organized (or collusive) and 
chaotic (or arbitrary) corruption14. In an environment with organized corruption 
the businessperson knows in advance whom to bribe, the size of the payment 
and the delivered service. Whereas in chaotic corruption, the uncertainty is 
high and the traders are not sure about the amount of the bribes necessary as 
well as the service provided to them. The risk-averse businessman may 
consequently avoid operating in a country with a chaotic corruption system. 
Hence, the effect of corruption is strongly influenced by the degree of 
predictability. “The more predictable the amounts to be paid and the services 
provided, the less detrimental the effects of corruption” (De Jong and Udo, 
2006, p. 3).  
 
Wei (1997) makes an interesting comparison; he links the effect of corruption 
on FDI with taxing. The result is a negative effect of corruption on FDI, even 
higher than the effect of taxes. An increase in uncertainty from the level of 
Singapore to that of Mexico equals a tax rate rise on multinational firms by 32 
percentage points (Wei, 1997). Wei interprets this result in the way that 
corruption is not predictable in contrast to taxes. “Corruption, unlike tax, is not 
transparent, not pre-announced, and carries much poorer enforcement of an 
agreement between briber and a bribee” (Wei, 1997, p. 1). In a country with 
organized corruption, where the amount of bribe payments are more or less 
transparent and the outcome is more or less reliable, corruption is equal to 
taxes. For a company it does not matter if the money goes to the government 
or into a bureaucrat’s pocket, from a rational point of view (Wei, 1997). 
 
To summarize, apart from the level of corruption, the predictability of 
corruption strongly determines the economic effects. Countries with 
predictable corruption have higher investment rates than countries with 
arbitrary corruption. This holds for developing as well for industrialized 
countries (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
 
                                                
14 More in chapter “Coercive versus collusive corruption”, p. 19 
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3.5.2 Corruption and market entry strategies 
Does corruption influence the way firms enter new markets? 
 
According to the “Eclectic theory of the choice of international entry mode” of 
Hill et al. (1990) market entry is determined by its resource commitment, the 
degree of control and dissemination risk15. Low market familiarity and high 
environmental risk16 of new markets induce firms to choose an entry strategy 
with low resource commitment, low dissemination risk and high degree of 
control. However, when the business involves high sophisticated technology, 
firms fear opportunistic behavior on behalf of local partners and thus prefer 
entry modes with high degree of control and know-how protection. 
 
When entering new markets with high uncertainty firms attempt to reduce 
risks and costs by adapting particular entry strategies. Non-equity based 
market entries, such as licensing or franchising, allow firms the presence in a 
market without large capital investments. It represents a low cost and low risk 
approach of market entry. Whereas equity based market entries, such as Joint 
Ventures, Mergers & Acquisitions or wholly owned subsidiaries, are 
associated with higher resource commitment and risk. These equity based 
entry strategies include FDI and are connected with lasting economical 
interest of companies but also with frequent interaction with various local 
government offices (Hill et al., 1990). Therefore, in corrupt environments 
MNCs prefer non-equity based entry modes rather than equity based market 
entries. 
 
Smarzynska and Wei (2000) observe, when entering highly corrupt markets 
firms are rather unfamiliar with the business practices and thus prefer to 
cooperate with local business partners, who might be better acquainted with 
local (corrupt) practices. International firms prefer Joint Ventures with local 
                                                
15 Dissemination risk refers to the possibility that firm specific know-how can be expropriated 
by local Joint Venture or licensing partners (Hill et al., 1990). 
16 Since corruption is a factor of uncertainty it depicts a form of environmental risk to 
companies (Lambsdorff, 2007). 
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partners to wholly owned subsidiaries. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) investigated 
market entries of firms in the telecommunication sector in 64 countries and 
reveal that companies respond to the pressure of corruption via short-term 
contracting and avoid the holding of equity. Contrarily to Smarzynska and Wei 
(2000) they did not find significant differences between Joint Ventures and 
wholly owned subsidiaries. But when applying the Eclectic Theory of Hill et al. 
(1990) one can conclude that the telecommunication sector is characterized 
by sophisticated technology, which has to be protected from expropriation by 
opportunistic business partners. 
 
The more widespread corruption is, the more likely foreign subsidiaries are 
faced with uncertain situations. Given this, a non-equity approach provides a 
volatile type of investment to avoid the uncertainty of corruption and result in a 
reduction of FDI (Lambsdorff, 2007, Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). 
 
3.5.3 Corruption and economic growth 
When a negative correlation between FDI and corruption is assumed 
(Javorcik and Wei, 2009, Habib and Zurawicki, 2001, De Jong and Udo, 2006) 
it is inevitable to analyze the interrelation of corruption and economic growth. 
 
In the previous part on causes of corruption it was already discussed that low 
economic growth, measured in GDP, could lead to higher corruption. On the 
other side of the coin, low GDP can stem from corruption and consequently 
deter economic growth. 
 
The literature clearly agrees on a linkage between corruption and economic 
development. Mauro (1995) carried out the first study that could provide 
empirical evidence for the effect of corruption on economic growth. He 
investigated data collected by Business International on 68 countries about 
country risk, such as political stability, corruption and bureaucratic efficiency. 
This index is based on standardized questionnaires filled in by business 
people and country experts and captures data from over three years. Mauro 
compared those factors of country risk with economic factors. His results 
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clearly show a statistical significant and negative correlation of corruption and 
investment, and a significant positive correlation of institutional efficiency and 
economic growth. 
 
Figure 6: Bureaucratic efficiency17 and GDP growth (Source: Mauro, 1995) 
 
He finds that corruption is strongly negatively related to investment rate, 
regardless of red tape. According to Levine and Renelt (1992) investment rate 
(measured in GDP) is a robust determinant of economic growth. Hence, if 
corruption decreases investment it also decreases economic growth, 
“Corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering economic growth” 
(Mauro, 1995, p. 681). As an example he states “if Bangladesh were to 
improve the integrity and efficiency of its bureaucracy to the level of Uruguay 
(corresponding to a one-standard-deviation increase in the bureaucratic 
efficiency index), its investment rate would rise by almost five percentage 
points, and its yearly GDP growth rate would rise by over half a percentage 
point” (Mauro, 1995, p. 705). 
 
                                                
17 Mauro’s bureaucratic efficiency index is computed by the average of three Business 
International indices, namely judiciary system, red tape, and corruption. A high value of the 
BE index means that the country's institutions are good (Mauro, 1995). 
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Likewise, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show that corruption lowers economic 
growth through four channels, namely high corruption results in lower 
government revenues, lower government expenditures on operations and 
maintenance, higher public investment in corrupt prone sectors, and lower 
quality of public infrastructure. In particular, these consequences occur when 
essential controlling or auditing mechanism are weak, hence when 
institutional quality is low. The decrease in government expenditures stems 
from a redistribution of public funds for civil services, such as education and 
health care, to corruption prone industries, such as military and construction; 
thus public investment increases. The authors used data from two indices, 
Business International Index (the same index as Mauro worked with) that 
includes data on 68 countries for the period 1980-83. The second index is 
published by the International Country Risk Guide and covers the time period 
of 1982-95, for 42-95 countries, depending on the year (Tanzi and Davoodi, 
1997). 
 
In 2000 Treisman (2000) found that by far the most important determinant of 
corruption is economic development, measured by real GDP per head. 
Moreover he discovered another interesting correlation between corruption 
and economic growth. He figured out that economic growth reduces 
corruption significantly, by enhancing education and by the rationalization of 
public and private roles. Economic growth lowers the acceptance of corruption 
in society. Treisman states, “Policies that boost growth, if consistently and 
successfully implemented, are likely in the long run to reduce corruption” 
(Treisman, 2000, p. 440) since high corruption restrains investment and 
growth. 
 
Paldam (2002) finds supporting evidence, by using the CPI by Transparency 
International and notes that economic development of transitional countries 
from poor and traditional to wealthy and liberal brings along dramatic 
reduction in the corruption level. 
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3.5.4 Corruption and national competitiveness 
Closely interlinked with the consequence of low economic development is the 
issue of national competitiveness, which is of great importance to attract 
international investors. National competitiveness is defined as “the facts and 
policies that shape the ability of a nation to create and maintain an 
environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more 
prosperity for its people” (Samanta and Sanyal, 2010, p. 90). 
 
Due to globalization and free trade agreements “potential investors now have 
a wider range of countries to choose from to locate their business facilities or 
to put in their resources for profit. Not all countries are equally attractive to 
foreign investors; some are more than others. Increasingly, countries are 
being calibrated on the basis of how competitive they are as places to do 
business in” (Samanta and Sanyal, 2010, p. 89). Sanyal (2005) finds 
significant evidence that bribery retards national competitiveness and hence, 
economic growth. Given this, the more a country is attractive for companies, 
the higher will be its level of FDI, resulting in higher economic growth. 
 
Samanta and Sanyal (2010) investigated whether a nation’s economic 
attractiveness is associated with how it is perceived in terms of bribe taking. 
Their results indicate a significant negative correlation of the perceived level 
of corruption and the economic competitiveness of a country. A highly 
competitive country is less likely to have an economic system where corrupt 
business practices are widespread. Similarly, a country ranked low on 
competitiveness is likely to be perceived as a corrupt environment to do 
business. This holds also for developing and developed countries. However 
they suggest that this finding does not necessarily imply that wealthier 
countries are more competitive, and vice versa. They conclude that if bribery 
is part of the prevailing culture of doing business in one country, investors are 
likely to avoid such markets, in favor of those that are perceived to have a 
more ethical business climate (Samanta and Sanyal, 2010). 
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Certainly there are many other factors determining national competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, high levels of perceived corruption do harm the country’s 
competitive positioning in international business. 
 
 
3.5.5 Corruption and the theory of positive effects 
This theory implies that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that 
fighting bribery would be counterproductive. In particular it argues that 
corruption might help companies to overcome sluggish and time-consuming 
bureaucracies, also called ‘red tape’18 (Doh et al., 2003), and “bribes might 
serve as lubricants in an otherwise stagnant economy” (De Jong and Udo, 
2006, p. 3). 
During 1970’s this assumption was quite accepted by society, especially 
regarding business in developing countries. The most quoted representative 
of this ideology is Samuel P. Huntington, who stated 1968 “in terms of 
economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with rigid, over-centralized and 
honest bureaucracy” (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000, p. 3). According to his point 
of view corruption is a necessary vehicle to make the economy work 
efficiently. 
 
In 1985 the theory of positive effects was supported by Lui, who examined the 
efficiency of bribery in the context of a queue where customers with different 
values of time are ranked by the size of their bribe payments to the 
responsible manager of the queue. The size of their payments is an 
expression of the time the customer is expected to spend in the queue. With 
this model he could prove that corrupt payments can minimize the waiting 
time and hence, increase the efficiency of the process because those 
customers to whom time is most important are willing to bribe (Lui, 1985). 
                                                
18 Red tape = regulatory burden, such as tax licenses, delays and so on, especially in public 
business; Named after the red or pink tape used to bind and secure official documents 
(Kaufmann and Wei, 1999). 
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Beck and Maher (1986) come to a similar conclusion. They show that in third 
world countries public procurements are often decided by bribery and further 
that the most efficient companies are paying the highest amount of bribe 
(Beck and Mahar, 1986). Hence, Beck and Mahar stress that an equilibrium 
model of bribery is comparable with a competitive bidding model. In fact, in 
both cases the same company, which was the most efficient, won the contract 
and the client, here the government, paid the same purchase price. “These 
results imply, that in the absence of penalties for bribery, supplier firms would 
be indifferent between bribery and bidding institutions. If all suppliers face the 
same penalty, then the equilibrium bribe would be reduced by the amount of 
the penalty, and the isomorphism between bribery and bidding would be 
retained” (Beck and Mahar, 1986, p. 5). 
 
The model of Lui (1985) and Beck and Maher (1986) assume that the size of 
the bribe payment is the only significant factor for the awarding of the 
contract. They neglect the possibility of favoritism and nepotism, which means 
that customers with connections to family and friends are preferred 
irrespective of the bribe payments of other participants (Beck and Mahar, 
1986). 
 
Bardhan (1997) criticizes Lui’s model and remarks that the possible behavior 
of moral hazard has not been considered. Lui (1985) assumes the reliability of 
the participants, meaning that both sides, customers and the responsible 
manager are honest in the sense that they stick to the deal, and that the other 
customers do not increase their first bribe offer and so on. Hence, Lui’s 
assumption that corruption is perfectly organized, does not hold against 
factors such as unpredictability (Bardhan, 1997). 
 
Kaufmann and Wei (2000) found empirical evidence for the rejection of the 
theory of positive effects. They used data from three large and international 
surveys conducted with managers asking them about the time they spend on 
dealing with bureaucratic obstacles. According to the theory of positive effects 
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this fruitless time should decrease when making use of illicit payments and 
accelerate bureaucratic procedures. However, surprisingly corruption 
increased the time they spend on transactions significantly. “Contrary to the 
efficient [grease] theory, we find out that firms that pay more bribes are also 
likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating 
regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital” (Kaufmann and Wei, 
2000, p. 1). 
 
So why do firms still engage in corruption? From a macroeconomic point of 
view it is difficult to find a positive aspect of corruption. Nevertheless, when 
observing corruption from a private business perspective, corruption certainly 
might have some efficiency improving effects, especially in transition 
economies with weak governments. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that it enables entrepreneurs to overcome 
cumbersome regulations and to avoid red tape in countries with weak 
governments. They give the example of post-Communist Russia where it is 
inevitable for a foreign investor to bribe all public agencies that are involved in 
the FDI, such as local government, the foreign investment office, the central 
bank and so on. From an economic point of view, these practices are 
detrimental to foreign investment, but from the foreign investor’s perspective 
corruption allows to overcome such trade barriers. 
 
Houston (2007) views that corruption can have positive economic effects and 
work as useful substitutes in economies with weak or missing legal protection 
of exchange and property rights. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) argue that when 
indicators of economic freedom, such as legal security of private ownership 
rights, the viability of contracts, are not given, corruption can work as an 
informal buffer which mediates business interests. 
 
The likelihood that corruption is beneficial, in terms of speeding up 
transactions, only holds for countries where bureaucratic regulations are 
excessive and cumbersome (Mauro, 1995). But in fact, those distortions and 
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excessive bureaucracy is caused by corruption itself. This conclusion is 
supported in the literature which states that corrupt officials may, instead of 
speeding up the transaction, actually cause administrative delays and impose 
additional burdens in order to attract more bribes (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, 
Bardhan, 1997). 
 
In some cases, paying bribes to avoid burdens may be more efficient than 
struggling with cumbersome regulations, but nonetheless corruption is always 
a second best response to government failure (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
Bardhan (1997) concludes in his survey paper, “in the second best case, it is 
presumed that a given set of distortions are mitigated or circumvented by the 
effects of corruption; but quite often these distortions and corruption are 
caused or at least preserved or aggravated by the same common factors. The 
distortions are not exogenous to the system and are instead often part of the 
built-in corrupt practices of a patron-client political system” (Bardhan, 1997, p. 
1323). 
 
To summarize, even if there are cases, where corruption can improve 
efficiency, the necessity is artificially created by corruption itself. However, 
researchers emphasize that the institutionalization of bribery is detrimental to 
the economic wealth of a country in the long run (Sung, 2005). Further the 
literature agrees that the negative aspects of corruption outweigh the 
advantages. Corruption does not decrease bureaucratic burdens, but actually 
creates excessive bureaucracy (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). 
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4 PART II: Corruption and MNCs 
 
Despite the fact that corruption is illegal almost everywhere (De Jong and 
Udo, 2006), corruption indices reveal that it is as prevalent as ever in most 
countries (Collins et al., 2009). Corruption is still regarded as “the way things 
are done“. Globally operating businesses very often have to face bribery in 
foreign countries (Beets, 2005). A survey of the World Bank including 3600 
companies in 69 countries has discovered that 40% of those companies made 
illegal payments to facilitate international business (Beets, 2005). 
The increasing attention by media on corruption scandals in international 
business caused a higher public awareness on ethics and transparency. 
Hence, the behavior of multinational companies in foreign countries is being 
observed more than ever before. International anti-bribery conventions and 
the efforts of non-governmental organizations played a significant role in 
creating awareness of corruption, also on behalf of business practitioners. On 
the one hand it increased corporate ethics in the business world, but on the 
other hand it caused multinational firms to find better ways to hide corrupt 
transactions from prosecutors (OECD, 2009, TI, 2009). 
In general, this chapter discusses how multinational corporations deal with 
corruption in foreign markets. First it takes a look on the behavior of MNCs in 
corrupt environments and how this behavior is determined by the firms’ 
country of origin. The second part treats the issue why firms engage in 
corruption and how managers justify their illegitimate actions. Later on, the 
topic of lower moral standards in foreign markets is addressed in order to 
answer the question of double standards of MNCs. 
 
4.1 Behavior of MNCs in corrupt business environments 
This section takes a look on how multinational firms respond to corruption in 
foreign markets. Do multinational firms reject corruption or do they adopt their 
business practices to foreign market conditions and involve in corruption? 
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Does the level of corruption in the home market influence firms’ behavior in 
international trade? 
Several studies that have analyzed the behavior of international firms 
regarding corruption showed that the way international firms cope with it, is 
strongly determined by the acceptance of corruption in their home countries 
(Baughn et al., 2010, Sung, 2005, Sanyal and Samanta, 2004). This implies 
that firms from countries where corruption is tolerated are more prone to 
behave corrupt in international markets, than are firms from countries where 
corrupt practices are highly condemned. 
Sung (2005) reveals, that the behavior of multinational corporations in bribe 
paying is mainly affected by the extent of corruption in the firms’ home market 
(Sung, 2005). Multinational firms are influenced by the business environment 
of their headquartered country. They carry on with the business practices they 
are familiar with in international business. Consequently, if corruption is 
tolerated in the firm’s home country, the firm tends to pay bribes in foreign 
markets as well (Sanyal and Samanta, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 7: Domestic corruption and foreign bribery (Source: Sung, 2005) 
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Figure 7 illustrates the relation between domestic corruption and foreign 
bribery. The CPI was used to depict domestic corruption and the BPI scores 
were used to depict foreign bribery. The relationship is a positive linear 
function and states the higher a country is perceived to be corrupt within its 
borders, the higher it is also perceived to pay bribes abroad (Sung, 2005). 
Baughn et al. (2010) come to the same conclusion. In fact they state that 
bribe paying is the lowest when corruption is not tolerated in the multinational 
firms’ home country, and further when the home country has signed 
international conventions against corruption (such as the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, UN Convention Against Corruption). 
 
A problematic issue in foreign bribery is the use of intermediaries19. Due to the 
consequences of a disclosure of bribe paying, in particular in fear of a bad 
public reputation, some companies try to avoid being directly involved in 
corruption (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009, Lambsdorff, 2007). Instead 
companies hire intermediaries in order to avoid a direct trace leading from the 
multinational company to the bribed official (OECD, 2009, Bose and 
Gangopadhyay, 2009, Hasker and Okten, 2008, Bayar, 2005, Lambsdorff, 
2002). Intermediaries or middlemen carry out the ‘dirty work’ of bribery; they 
make the actual bribe payment. Intermediaries play a key role in foreign 
bribery of public officials because they are involved in most cases of foreign 
bribery. 
The intermediary might engage in corruption of his/her own free will, without 
informing the multinational firm. More serious, from an ethical point of view, is 
when the multinational firm intentionally wants to commit foreign bribery and 
asks the intermediary to do so, in order to distance itself from the crime and to 
decrease the chance of being detected (OECD, 2009). The intermediating 
person can be a friend or family member from the bribed official, or can be 
another third person such as a business consultant or even another company 
                                                
19 The OECD defines an intermediary as a person who acts as a link with or in between two 
or more trading parties. In the context of corruption, an intermediary can carry out 
legitimate business activities but also illegitimate bribery payments (OECD, 2009). 
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(TI, 2009). This was the case in the Siemens scandal in 2001-2007, when a 
Nigerian official was bribed to conclude a telecommunication contract. The 
bribe payment was channeled through a consultant who was the wife of a 
former Nigerian Vice President, living in the USA (OECD, 2009). 
When international conventions against foreign bribery came into force, the 
use of intermediaries has been increased tremendously because companies 
are more concerned of prosecution. However the use of an intermediary for 
bribery can also take place without knowledge of the company. For instance a 
foreign official requires hiring a specific agent, who in turn charges a 
commission fee to the firm, which in fact includes a hidden payment for the 
official (OECD, 2009). 
Foreign briberies with intermediaries are difficult to discover and to prosecute. 
Different strategies such as transferring the payment to foreign accounts, 
using several intermediaries, intermediaries located in other countries and so 
on cause low transparency. Further the firm argues that it did not know about 
the engagement by the intermediate in bribery (OECD, 2009). Such 
international offences also raise the question which jurisdiction is responsible 
for the prosecution. Hence, foreign bribery through intermediaries makes the 
combat of corruption in international business a big challenge. 
 
4.2 Justifications of corruption by business 
professionals 
 
Only few companies explicitly condemn corruption and give clear advice to 
their employees how to report suspected cases of corruption (The Economist, 
2002). Firms are concerned that the report of corrupt behavior could displease 
corrupt public officials without changing the behavior of others (Doh et al., 
2003). Besides, employees of multinational corporations are often expected 
by top management to tolerate and ignore corruption abroad (Sung, 2005). 
High executives implicitly tolerate corruption, but neither want to be involved 
in the crime directly, nor do they want to know any details of it (Sung, 2005). 
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For this reason the bribery is carried out by employees, foreign subsidiaries or 
by local Joint Venture partners (OECD, 2009). 
 
A firm’s engagement in corrupt transactions is fundamentally driven by 
executives’ decision (Collins et al., 2009). So far the focus was on firm-level 
and country-level factors explaining corruption. This section analyzes the 
engagement in corruption from a manager’s point of view. 
 
Even though managers share the view that corruption harms the society, 
businesses frequently engage in corruption. Business people justify their 
corrupt behavior first on business necessity and claim that it is the way of 
doing business in those countries (Sanyal and Samanta, 2004). They argue 
that in some countries public officials are unscrupulous and have set up well 
organized corrupt systems which makes doing business without bribe paying 
impossible. For that reason they see those payments as acceptable payoffs 
and everyday business in certain countries (Rose-Ackerman, 2002). A second 
justification of bribery is to overcome red tape. Business people indicate that 
some bureaucratic systems are so chaotically organized and exploitative, that 
firms need to bribe in order to deal with sluggish and overregulated public 
offices (Rose-Ackerman, 2002, Doh et al., 2003). 
Indeed some businesses indicate that corruption creates an opportunity for 
international firms to overcome problems when entering new markets (Doh et 
al., 2003, The Economist, 2002). Some companies striving for new business 
make use of unethical practices to obtain it (Sanyal and Samanta, 2004). “In 
general, firms, both domestic and foreign, justify their behavior as a means to 
their greater goal of the creation of economic value and as a necessary, if 
unpleasant, response to the weakness and venality of governments” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2002, p. 1891). 
 
Although managers recognize that bribery is morally wrong they find ways to 
institutionalize corrupt practices and thus corruption receives legitimacy and 
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becomes accepted within the organization and its members (Collins et al., 
2009, Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). These are rationalizing strategies, mental 
tactics that help employees to offset negative concerns and guilt that arise 
from participation in unethical activities (Anand et al., 2005). Rationalizing 
strategies gives corruption a touch of normality (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). 
Collins et al. (2009) figured out that the probability of a firm to participate in 
corruption increases with the degree of its executives and top managers to 
rationalize corruption as a necessity for being competitive. However their 
study was conducted on a survey of top-level executives limited to only one 
country, namely India. 
Nevertheless, other studies give support to this view as well. Rabl and 
Kühlmann (2009) analyzed frequently used rationalizing strategies to justify 
corruption and present eight types of rational justifications, based on the work 
of Ashforth and Anand (2003). These are: 
(1) Legality, participants of corrupt transactions argue that corruption is not 
explicitly forbidden by law (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). Especially corruption 
conducted abroad does not violate national laws in most countries (Pieth, 
1999). (2) Denial of responsibility, the participants refuse their responsibility 
for the illegal action and claim that they had no other choice (Rabl and 
Kühlmann, 2009). The triggering circumstances, which forced them to behave 
illegal, are beyond their control. For instance bribe paying is a business 
necessity in some countries, or the competition is making use of bribery as 
well, or for economic value creation as an obligation to the firm (Rose-
Ackerman, 2002, Sanyal and Samanta, 2004, Doh et al., 2003). (3) Denial of 
injury, the participant does not admit any harmful consequences from the 
corrupt action to anyone (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). (4) The denial of victim, 
the corrupt actor denies that there are victims of his behavior because either 
the other side voluntarily agreed to participate, or other competitors deserved 
it due to former unfair practices (Ashforth and Anand, 2003). (5) Social 
weighting refers to selective social comparison; in particular those who blame 
the corrupt act are downward criticized. For example it is claimed that there 
are participants who are more corrupt and unscrupulous (Ashforth and Anand, 
2003). (6) The appeal to higher loyalties applies when ethical norms are 
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sacrificed for more important goals, such as profit maximization (Ashforth and 
Anand, 2003, Rose-Ackerman, 2002). (7) Metaphor of the ledger, this 
rationalization implies that former good behavior at the workplace offsets 
minor corrupt acts (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). (8) Refocusing attention, 
corrupt actors fade out unethical activities in order to perceive normality (Rabl 
and Kühlmann, 2009). 
 
Rabl and Kühlmann (2009) found that the most frequently used justification for 
corrupt behavior is the metaphor of the ledger (7), arguing that apart from this 
the actor did a good job in the past and thus, earned good credit. “Why 
shouldn’t I take advantage of the good business relationship I developed over 
several years?” (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009, p. 277) was the most popular 
argumentation among the participants of the experiment. Further the 
argument of appealing to higher loyalties (6) is used very often, claiming that 
other organizational goals are of greater importance; “I only did everything to 
increase the order situation and the income of our company” (Rabl and 
Kühlmann, 2009, p. 277). 
The findings correspond with the results of former studies (Rosenberg, 1987, 
Vitell and Festervand, 1987), which examined managers’ value systems in the 
context of bribe payments to foreign officials. According to those studies, 
business professionals who are faced with an ethical conflict, tend to opt for 
the more profitable strategy rather than choosing the ethical one. Hence, 
managers’ first responsibility is to pursue economic goals, and ethical values 
are only subordinated. 
 
These observations show that the organizational culture plays a pivotal role in 
shaping the attitude towards corruption. Corrupt business people have 
otherwise law-abiding character and have moral standards, but through 
rationalizing and reinforcement within a group, ethical norms and practices 
are overrun (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009, Rabl and Kühlmann, 2009). 
Instead of creating a culture of dishonesty and corruption within the 
organization (Lambsdorff, 2007), top management can influence the ethical 
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behavior of employees by transmitting a business philosophy of ethical 
standards and social responsibility (Vitell and Festervand, 1987). Hiring 
honest employees is not sufficient enough to avoid corruption. Companies 
should introduce norms of loyalty, corporate codes of conduct and monitoring 
and incentive systems to direct the behavior of employees (Rose-Ackerman, 
1997). 
 
4.3 MNCs and corruption in developing countries 
 
Indeed, the Bribe Payers Index shows that almost all major exporting 
countries are more likely to provide bribes in low-income countries than in 
high-income countries (Baughn et al., 2010). Many MNCs from industrial 
countries routinely engage in bribery in developing countries with the intention 
of landing new business deals (Glynn et al., 1997). Glynn et al. (1997) 
interpret this practice as a result of the tax deductibility of foreign bribes, 
which allows companies from mainly industrial nations to deduct their bribe 
payments as costs of doing business20. 
Peter Eigen, founder of Transparency International, highlights, “Our new 
survey leaves no doubt that large numbers of multinational corporations from 
the richest nations are pursuing a criminal course to win contracts in the 
leading emerging market economies in the world” (Transparency International, 
IS 8). 
Given the fact that less developed and undemocratic economies have higher 
corruption rates, many business people consider bribery of foreign civil 
servants in developing countries as a business necessity to do business 
(Sung, 2005, Sanyal and Samanta, 2004). 
 
                                                
20 More on tax deductibility of foreign bribery, see chapter “International and transnational 
anti-corruption laws”, p. 53 
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Are multinational corporations responsible for corruption in developing 
countries? According to some researchers, MNCs have introduced and 
disseminate corruption in developing countries, due to their better financial 
positioning compared to local firms. This argument perceives developing 
nations as victims of globalization (Moran, 2006, Heimann and Mohn, 1999). 
 
Corruption is a two-sided phenomenon and always requires two willing parties  
– the demand side, describing the recipient of the bribe, and the supply side, 
describing the payer of the bribe. In general, the crime can be driven by the 
supply side or the demand side. There is no one to blame for introducing 
corruption. Corruption violates ethical standards, regardless where it takes 
place, whether in Africa, Asia, Europe or in the United States (Rose-
Ackerman, 2002, Heimann and Mohn, 1999). Probably, poor countries have a 
higher degree of “traditional” corruption, such as facilitation payments. Rich 
countries have developed new forms of corruption, “sophisticated” practices, 
such as lobbying21 or financing of political campaigns. This kind of grand 
corruption is not included in most corruption indices and puts industrialized 
countries in an apparently better situation (Graeff and Mehlkop, 2003). 
 
4.4 Double standards of MNCs in foreign markets 
This section of the paper addresses the ethical dilemma of MNCs that comes 
up when engaging in corruption in international business. In particular it 
accuses MNCs of double standards when operating in foreign countries. 
Double standard is defined as “moral code or standard that applies more 
rigorously to one group of people or circumstances than to another” (Online 
                                                
21 Lobbying refers to social and economic power of interest groups to directly impact the 
content and implementation of laws through influencing government representatives. In 
contrast to ordinary corruption, lobbying is legally allowed in most countries but when the 
interests of large corporations are involved, the line between lobbying and corruption can 
be crossed rapidly (Eicher, 2009). 
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Dictionary, IS 4). In the context of corruption, double standard describes the 
use of different standards of business ethics in different markets. 
 
Some experts blame multinational enterprises for systematic bribery in foreign 
markets as a strategy to achieve access to new markets, which are otherwise 
closed to foreign investors (The Economist, 2002, Doh et al., 2003). Baughn 
et al. (2010) compared the scores of the Briber Payers Index and the 
Corruption Perception Index and found that the BPI scores of the major 
exporting countries are significantly lower than their CPI scores. Those 
countries are perceived significantly more corrupt in foreign markets than in 
their home markets. Considering these findings, the question comes up if 
firms’ willingness to bribe is higher in foreign markets than in home markets? 
 
In the context of international business, the literature represents two theories, 
namely first multinational firms are forced to bribe because of a demand 
driven and corrupt environment. It claims multinational firms being victims of 
corruption in foreign markets (Houston, 2007, Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, Lui, 
1985). The second theory views multinational firms actively engaging in 
corruption and introducing corruption to developing countries by their 
willingness and ability to bribe. Therefore the theory describes supply driven 
corruption (Sung, 2005, The Economist, 2002, Vogl, 1998). 
 
Sung (2005) comes to an interesting conclusion in his study about bribery in 
international trade. With data from the Bribe Payers Survey in 1999 by TI on 
19 leading exporting countries, Sung tested two hypotheses - the demand-pull 
hypothesis and the supply-push hypothesis. The demand-pull hypothesis 
tests a positive relationship between the corruption level in the foreign market 
and bribery by guest businesses. The theory predicts the higher the corruption 
in the foreign country, the higher will be the rate of bribery by foreign 
businesses. Whereas the supply-push thesis argues, “bribe paying behavior is 
largely determined by the extent of corruption and tolerance of foreign bribery 
in exporting countries. Multinational corporations based in pro- bribery 
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exporting countries practice systematic bribery as a business strategy to 
acquire overseas markets” (Sung, 2005, p. 115). Sung finds strong empirical 
evidence for the supply-push hypothesis and confirms a positive relationship 
between the acceptance of corruption of exporting countries and the bribe 
paying behavior of its multinational companies. Furthermore he states, 
“exporting countries not formally committed to enact anti-bribery laws, act as 
main exporters of bribes in international trade” (2005, p. 122). Countries that 
had not signed the OECD Anti-bribery Convention are perceived as the most 
serious foreign bribe payers in international business (Baughn et al., 2010, 
Sung, 2005). Hence the behavior of multinational corporations is strongly 
influenced by its home country. Whether corruption is tolerated or not, 
whether corrupt cases are successfully prosecuted and sentenced and 
whether governments of home countries enforce international anti-bribery 
laws or not. Sung backs up his findings with robust empirical evidences. 
 
Sung’s findings imply, rather than being innocent victims of excessive 
bureaucracy and ruthless public officials, many multinational firms 
headquartered in the major exporting countries are proactive participants in 
corruption. Illegal payments and special favors are provided in order to 
receive foreign permissions and procurements. (Sung, 2005, Vogl, 1998). 
Rose-Ackerman (2002) describes that for the purpose of ethically legitimate 
corruption, companies invoke a double standard in which laws in foreign 
countries are taken as irrelevant, even though high ethical norms and values 
are met in their home markets.  
 
Another paradox is that upper management of MNCs expects their 
subordinated management to tolerate bribery and to ignore details of 
questionable actions (Sung, 2005, Rose-Ackerman, 2002). Moran (2006, p.1) 
highlights, “Multinational corporations from the US, Europe, and Japan have 
devised sophisticated payment mechanisms […] to evade home country anti-
corruption laws”. Sung (2005) accuse exporting countries of double standards 
when putting pressure on developing countries to curb corruption while at the 
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same time allowing their own multinationals to deduct their foreign bribes from 
corporate tax. The governments of exporting countries and the leaders of 
MNCs are aware of those unethical business practices (Vogl, 1998). Peter 
Eigen comments, “Politicians and public officials from the world’s leading 
industrial countries are ignoring the rot in their own backyards and the criminal 
bribe-paying activities of multinational firms headquartered in their countries. 
The governments of the richest nations continue to fail to recognize the 
rampant undermining of fair global trade by bribe-paying multinational 
enterprises” (Transparency International, IS 8). 
 
The findings conclude that MNCs operate with different standards of business 
ethics and demonstrates a contradicting behavior of many multinationals that 
follow the trend of communicating high social responsibility in industrialized 
markets (Eicher, 2009, Keinert, 2008, Rondinelli and Berry, 2000), but when it 
comes to business in foreign markets, in particular developing markets, MNCs 
operate with different standards. When employing the definition of double 
standards it can be argued that MNCs apply double standards regarding 
corruption. Ethical norms, which hold for industrial markets are no longer 
abided in international business (Fleming and Zyglidopoulos, 2009) and 
justified as ‘the way of doing business in other countries’ (Rabl and Kühlmann, 
2009, Sanyal and Samanta, 2004, Doh et al., 2003, Rose-Ackerman, 2002). 
 
From a behavioral scientist’s point of view, Rose- Ackerman (2002) argues 
that multinationals have the obligation to take a broader perspective than 
profit maximization and that it is their moral responsibility they owe to their 
stakeholders. This holds especially for global corporations due to their 
superior knowledge. Thus, organizations are compelled to establish clear and 
well-enforced corporate guidelines. 
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5 PART III: Anti-corruption and MNCs 
 
The main prerequisite to limit corruption in international business is to legally 
criminalize corruption, within and beyond a countries border. 
 
This chapter discusses international and national actions against corruption, 
in particular regarding foreign bribery. First it gives a brief overview on the 
most important international conventions of the World Bank, OECD and the 
UN, but also takes a look on national laws, such as the US American FCPA. 
On this basis the effectiveness and compliance of anti corruption laws by 
multinationals are examined. The chapter is then concluded with a discussion 
on business ethics and corruption and the impact of code of conducts on 
ethical behavior. 
 
5.1 International and transnational anti-corruption laws 
In the last 40 years a remarkable number of governmental and non-
governmental international institutions have called for legal actions against 
international corruption. It started in the early 1970s when the American 
Watergate scandal became public and exposed a series of corrupt practices 
by US American multinationals, including bribe payments to foreign public 
officials (Glynn et al., 1997). This was the driving force for the passing of the 
first transnational anti-bribery law, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA), 
which was approved by the U.S. Congress in 1977. This act made it illegal for 
U.S. businesses and individuals to pay or offer to pay foreign government 
officials to obtain business (McKinney and Moore, 2007). The U.S. business 
community complained about serious losses due to the FCPA and 
disadvantages in competing abroad since their international competitors did 
not face such penalties for bribery (McKinney and Moore, 2008, Pieth, 1999, 
Glynn et al., 1997). Therefore it was in the interest of the U.S. government to 
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accelerate the implementation of international agreements on combating 
foreign bribery (Burger and Holland, 2006, Pieth, 1999). 
 
The FCPA was the first national legislation that addressed bribery from the 
supply side (McKinney and Moore, 2008). In 1999, nearly two decades later, 
the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions was signed by 37 countries and came 
into force. The main goal was to criminalize foreign bribery by requiring 
countries to implement laws on a national level. In addition, the convention 
was designed to abolish the tax deductibility of foreign bribery (Sanyal and 
Samanta, 2004). 
 
The most substantial deterrent of anti-corruption efforts is the tax deductibility 
of foreign bribery. Many countries, mostly developed nations, do not 
criminalize foreign bribery and even permit companies to deduct such bribes 
as a legitimate business expense. Consequently, many MNCs from industrial 
countries routinely engage in corruption outside their home countries 
(McKinney and Moore, 2008, Sanyal and Samanta, 2004, Glynn et al., 1997). 
An interpretation of the legal situation, is that bribing someone in the home 
market is illegal but bribing someone in a foreign market is legally correct. 
This brings companies in a contradictable situation, where on the one hand 
corruption is unethical within the borders, but on the other hand the legal 
framework encourages them to do so abroad (Vogl, 1998, Heimann, 1997). 
 
Sanyal and Samanta (2004) found that companies from countries with tax 
deductibility of foreign bribery are perceived more corrupt in international 
business than companies that cannot deduct their bribe payments as costs of 
doing business. As long as these legal frameworks exist, governments will 
send the message that they support foreign bribery. The abolishment of the 
deductibility of foreign bribes can have a notable effect on corporate behavior 
(Heimann, 1997). 
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For quite a long time the United States was the only exceptional country that 
criminalizes overseas bribery since 1977 when the FCPA came into force 
(Burger and Holland, 2006). The U.S. has been the most active country in the 
prosecution of overseas bribery. The main reason for the reluctance of 
exporting governments to abolish the tax deductibility is that they “seek to 
boost the competitiveness of their industries abroad […] and so reject external 
requests to ban foreign bribery” (Sung, 2005, p. 114). 
 
The first agreement with truly global character was the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption with 140 signatories and came into effect in 
2005. It calls the participating countries for the criminalization and law 
enforcement of corruption and the denial of tax deductibility of bribes (United 
Nations, 2004). Due to its focus on international bribery and its well-
established monitoring system, the UN Convention is regarded as the most 
significant of the three international conventions (Burger and Holland, 2006). 
 
However, the effectiveness of all three conventions is strongly criticized. 
During 1995 and 2000 the U.S. government reported an average of 0.8 
prosecutions of foreign bribery cases per year. Between 2001 and 2005 it was 
3.8 cases in average per year (Burger and Holland, 2006). The main criticism 
on the OECD Convention is that it lacks enforcement mechanism in the form 
of implementation in national legislation (Burger and Holland, 2006). 
Transparency International emphasizes that 2/3 of the signatories 
considerably lag behind in implementation. This evokes the suspicion that 
OECD members have no substantial interest to meet the conventions 
obligation (Heimann and Dell, 2010). 
Another weakness of the FCPA and the OECD Convention is the exception of 
facilitation payments, which is often called “grease” money (Heimann and 
Dell, 2010, Glynn et al., 1997). These are payments to lower–level officials to 
accelerate administrative processes, for instance to speed up the installation 
of telephones or the loading and unloading of cargo (Sanyal and Samanta, 
2004). 
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A positive aspect of the UN Convention is the international character of the 
agreement, which incorporates industrialized countries and developing 
countries as well. On the other hand the high number of member states 
makes it difficult to come to an agreement, e.g. the member countries failed in 
defining corruption, since activities regarded as illegal in some countries might 
be legal in other countries (Burger and Holland, 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, international conventions are extremely important to set a legal 
foundation for the criminalization of corruption and to put a further step in 
condemning unethical practices in international business. It is necessary that 
civil societies, governments and business professionals pull in the same 
direction. The establishment of international agreements is designed to 
address the problem from the supply side. Now it’s the turn of governments to 
enforce those laws and the role of multinational corporations to comply with 
these rules. 
 
5.2 National enforcement of international conventions 
While all countries prohibit and punish bribery of their own public officials, the 
prosecution of their home-based multinationals for bribery of foreign public 
officials is rather exceptional. Many countries tolerate corrupt practices as 
long as it takes place outside their national borders. Most governments are 
not concerned about corruption taking place abroad, which is obviously 
evident in the tax deductibility of overseas bribes (Burger and Holland, 2006, 
Sung, 2005, Glynn et al., 1997). However, in a global economy it is difficult to 
distinguish between international and national economy. 
 
When the OECD first raised the issue of prohibiting bribery of foreign public 
officials, the main European governments first refused the proposal, arguing 
that only bribe accepting countries can effectively reduce corruption (Sung, 
2005). The background for this negative attitude towards criminalizing foreign 
bribery is the lack of interest to penalize their exporting companies (Sacerdoti, 
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1999, Glynn et al., 1997). Hence, although the OECD Convention was 
adopted in 1977, it took 22 years until it came into force. By the official 
accounts the delay was caused due to disagreement among member 
countries on the definition of corruption, but there is no doubt that the 
commitment of the countries to address the problem of foreign corruption was 
paradoxical (Burger and Holland, 2006). Burger and Holland commented, 
“This 22 year exercise in delay provides some window into governments’ 
incentives to investigate and criminally prosecute their own Nations’ bribes to 
foreign officials to obtain or maintain business” (2006, p. 54). The real cause 
may be that such countries and their officials are having interest in expanding 
their export markets (Burger and Holland, 2006). 
37 countries have ensured the abolishment of tax deductibility of bribes by 
signing the OECD Convention. Until 2007, only three countries- U.S., South 
Korea, Sweden- have introduced penalties for international bribery in their 
legislation, while four of them- Canada, Italy, Norway, UK- have begun with 
investigations regarding the introduction of such penalties (McKinney and 
Moore, 2008). Governments fear that they would disadvantage their 
corporations in international bidding contracts (Sung, 2005). This evokes the 
feeling that international and national programs and written rules have a 
deterrent effect in practice. 
 
In the last few years a change in governments’ policy regarding foreign 
bribery is noticeable. In 1999 the South Korean Act on Preventing Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (FBPA) came 
into force. Under this law it is prohibited to directly or indirectly bribe Korean or 
foreign public officials. The law covers also job opportunities, gifts and lavish 
meals but excludes facilitation payments (Choi and McDaniel, 2010). In 
Sweden the Penal Code of 1962, which penalizes bribery but with a relatively 
vague definition, set the legal prerequisite for the substantial amendment of 
Swedish anti-bribery law in 2010 (OECD, IS 9). The United Kingdom passed 
the Anti-Bribery Act 2010, which is planned to come into force in July 2011. 
This act criminalizes the offering or giving of domestic and foreign bribery of 
public officials by UK citizens or enterprises (UK Ministry of Justice, IS 10). So 
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far the effective enforcement of the Act is difficult to assess from today’s point 
of view and it has to be observed in the future.  
 
Mark Pieth, the chairman of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in 
International Business Transactions has recently commented “the further 
pursuit of corporate bribery will require prosecutors to take a fresh look at the 
behavior of their highly respected local companies when operating outside 
their home markets” (The Economist, 2002). 
Rose-Ackerman (2002) sees an observable worldwide norm change in the 
anti-corruption policy promoted by non-governmental organizations, such as 
Transparency International, which has given more visibility towards the 
problem of overseas bribery. The increasing pressure from civil society and 
international reputation makes governments more conscious about 
international corruption. 
 
5.3 Compliance with anti-corruption laws by MNCs 
While there are signals for a change in the global recognition of corruption, 
namely in the ratification of international conventions, it remains questionable 
how far companies will comply with it. 
Transparency International (BPI Report, 2008) investigated the familiarity of 
anti-corruption laws by business executives and found some unexpected 
results. In particular, the knowledge about the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
was observed in the participating countries of the Bribe Payers Survey in 
2008. It revealed that 75% of the participating senior business executives 
were not familiar with the convention at all. Further, business executives from 
higher income countries are less informed about the OECD Convention than 
those from lower income countries. Figure 8 demonstrates respondents’ 
knowledge on the OECD Convention. Respondents from Western Europe and 
the United States regions have had the lowest knowledge (TI, 2008). 
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This illustrates firstly the insufficient enforcement of international anti-bribery 
laws and secondly, the inconsistent enforcement policies among regions. 
Moran (2006) criticizes MNCs for evading home country anti-corruption laws, 
by relabeling bribes as commissions. Instead of directly handing out bribes, 
firms cover illegal payments as loans, distributing shares or making use of 
intermediaries. Vogl (1998) comments that leaders of many MNCs unofficially 
acknowledge the payment of bribes by their subsidiaries and further confirms 
the knowledge of governments about these activities. 
 
Nevertheless, it can be said that global firms are beginning to accept the 
benefits of anti-corruption for their international reputation. The trend in anti 
corruption campaigns is to highlight the role of the private sector (Rose-
Ackerman, 2002). 
 
5.4 The role of MNCs in anti-corruption 
International and national anti-corruption laws provide the basis for the 
combat of corruption. However an effective curb of corruption can only be 
reached, if the private sector takes a more active role in creating meaningful 
deterrents to international bribery. In a way that would be a great leap forward 
to promote ethical standards in the whole world (Burger and Holland, 2006). 
One tool to tackle corruption in business from inside is the implementation of 
corporate codes of conduct. A Code of conduct is defined as “a written, 
distinct, and formal document which consists of moral standards used to 
guide employee and/or corporate behavior” (McKinney and Moore, 2008, p. 
Figure 8: Degree of familiarity with OECD Convention (Source: TI, Bribe Payers Survey, 2008) 
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105). Heimann (1997) regards corporate codes of conduct as essential parts 
of far-reaching anti corruption programs but emphasizes that it cannot act as 
a substitute for governmental enforcement. Governmental regulations and 
self-regulations by businesses themselves reinforce each other.  
 
The opinions about the effectiveness of corporate codes of conduct are 
controversial. Recent research indicates heavy dependency of the 
effectiveness of codes of conduct on whether the codes are communicated in 
the corporation top down, so that it permeates the entire organization, or the 
codes are just a useless fig leaf (Hülsberg and Scheben, 2010, McKinney and 
Moore, 2008, Heimann, 1997). Compliance programs of firms need to 
integrate the code of ethics into their business philosophy. Heimann (1997, p. 
153) points out “individual companies must formulate codes specifically 
tailored to their own circumstances, including type of business, system of 
organization, and applicable legal rules”. 
 
One of the few studies on effectiveness of written codes of conduct in the 
particular context of international bribery, was carried out by McKinney and 
Moore (2008). Their findings indicate that business professionals of firms with 
written codes of conduct are significantly less likely to accept international 
bribery. The study is based on a mailing survey with a sample of 1210 U.S. 
business professionals. 
A successful code of conduct, regarding corruption, should contain a clear 
statement that prohibits its employees and third parties, representing the 
company, to offer directly or indirectly bribes in order to influence the behavior 
of public officials. Further it should give detailed guidelines on gift giving, 
political contributions, facilitation payments22 and reporting mechanism 
(Hülsberg and Scheben, 2010, Heimann, 1997). 
                                                
22 Small payments to low-level officials to speed up routine services (TI, 2009, Heimann, 
1997). 
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When owners and top managers want to prevent their companies from 
unethical behavior they must spell out their position clearly rather than merely 
relying on their employees’ moral conscience. Employees being faced with 
the conflict between profitability and morality are likely to decide on 
profitability unless owners and top managers give strong signals to prevent 
them. They should function as role models for the organization and set clear 
and well-enforced guidelines (Rose-Ackerman, 2002). 
In the 21st century modern corporations have to face the challenge of social 
responsibility. The trend for the increasing demand for fairer trade does not 
stop at national or regional boundaries (Keinert, 2008). Firms should be wise 
to combat corruption and realize the benefits of reduced corruption in the long 
run: a clear positioning will enforce company’s reputation and credibility, and 
strengthen business relations with customers and suppliers (Rose-Ackerman, 
2002). 
The enforcement of anti-corruption laws and codes of conducts is a major 
step forward in anti-corruption and will have a significant effect on MNCs’ 
behavior (Heimann, 1977). 
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6 Conclusion 
The goal of this diploma thesis was to analyze the role of multinational 
corporations regarding corruption in international business and to critically 
assess their behavior in foreign markets. 
 
The findings reveal that corruption is detrimental to international trade. In 
particular, the most significant characteristic impacting international business 
is the unpredictability of corruption. It is chaotic and non-transparent to foreign 
investors and has therefore a substantial impact on Foreign Direct 
Investment. 
 
Corruption still remains tolerated by many exporting companies in 
international business. Firms, headquartered in countries with high corruption, 
are the main supplier of illegal payments in international business. This 
includes firms from developing countries but as well from industrialized 
countries. Indeed, MNCs from industrialized countries have sophisticated 
payment mechanism to evade home country anti-corruption laws in foreign 
markets. 
 
MNCs operate with contradicting ethical standards in foreign countries, 
especially in developing countries. Ethical norms, which hold for industrial 
markets are no longer abided in international business. Globally operating 
companies meet high ethical norms in their home markets, but when it comes 
to business abroad, foreign laws of anti-corruption are taken as irrelevant. 
This implies that MNCs operate with different standards of business ethics. 
 
The higher the acceptance within the organization, the more likely are 
employees to engage in corruption. This implies, that representatives of firms 
can have an influence on the ethical behavior of their employees by 
transmitting a business philosophy of ethical standards and social 
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responsibility, for instance with the implementation of corporate codes of 
conduct. 
 
The major reason for large companies being more corrupt in foreign countries 
is the legal framework in their home countries, which does not explicitly 
declare foreign corruption as a criminal offence with the only exception of the 
United States, South Korea and Sweden. Additionally, many exporting 
countries permit their international firms to deduct foreign bribes as a 
legitimate business expense. Consequently, many MNCs from industrial 
countries routinely engage in corruption outside their home countries. 
Companies from countries with tax deductibility of foreign bribery are 
perceived to be more corrupt in international business. 
 
Nevertheless, the business community is witnessing a change of norms 
regarding corruption due to the efforts of international organizations and 
NGO’s. Transnational anti-bribery conventions were signed by developing and 
developed countries. The effective enforcement of those anti- corruption laws 
on national-level will significantly determine multinationals’ attitude towards 
this concern. However, under realistic conditions it will be impossible to 
entirely erase corruption, and a single-minded focus on corruption prevention 
will not be sufficient. The private sector, especially international firms have to 
take a more active role in anti-corruption, in order to curb unethical practices 
in business and that should in all likelihood be a gradual process. 
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8 Appendix 
 
Figure A: Corruption Perception Index 2010 (Source: Transparency International, IS 11)
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Korruption ist ein vielschichtiges und weitreichendes Phänomen, das im 
internationalen Geschäftsverkehr eine bedeutende und einflussreiche Rolle 
spielt. So verringert sie zum Beispiel die wirtschaftliche Attraktivität eines 
Landes für ausländische Investoren, und hemmt damit das 
Wirtschaftswachstum. Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit Korruption in 
der internationalen Wirtschaftswelt und untersucht das Verhalten von 
multinationalen Unternehmen in korrupten Märkten. Ziel ist eine kritische 
Auseinandersetzung des Umgangs multinationaler Unternehmen mit 
Korruption sowohl im Ursprungsland als auch auf internationalem Boden. 
Die volkswirtschaftlichen Ursachen und Auswirkungen von Korruption 
unterliegen bereits zahlreichen empirischen Studien, jedoch ist dieses 
Forschungsfeld im Zusammenhang mit Unternehmensethik aus (privat-) 
wirtschaftlicher Perspektive ein relativ unerschlossenes Gebiet. Daher soll im 
Folgenden die Frage inwieweit die Geschäftstätigkeit internationaler 
Unternehmen einer doppelten Moral unterliegen, beantwortet werden. 
 
Die Forschungsarbeit basiert auf einer ausführlichen Literaturrecherche und 
besteht aus Publikationen in Fachzeitschriften, Arbeitsmaterialien, die von 
internationalen Organisationen und NGO’s veröffentlicht wurden und 
schließlich aus Abhandlungen bedeutender Autoren im Feld der 
Korruptionsforschung. 
 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen auf, dass multinationale Unternehmen in 
ausländischen Märkten mit hoher Korruption- oft sind dies 
Entwicklungsländer- eine geringere Unternehmensethik vorweisen als in 
ihrem Ursprungsland. Widersprüchlich dazu kommunizieren viele dieser 
Unternehmen in industrialisierten Ländern hohe moralische und ethische 
Werte und Normen, aktuell im Zeichen des Trends nach Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Multinationale Unternehmen mit Sitz in Industrieländern 
kennen komplexe Mechanismen um Antikorruptionsgesetze in ihren 
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Auslandsgeschäften raffiniert zu umgehen, was eine moralische 
Doppelbödigkeit seitens multinationaler Unternehmen im Umgang mit 
Korruption impliziert. Diese Forschungsarbeit soll als Basis für weitere 
Studien, womöglich auch empirischen Untersuchungen, dienen.
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